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FEDERAL TAX LIENS: A GUIDE TO THE
PRIORITY SYSTEM OF SECTION 6323
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
DEAN L. OVERMAN*
This article presents an analysis of the system of priorities for
federal tax liens contained in section 6323 of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC),' which is intersected by the priority system contained
in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 2 The article begins with a
general introduction of federal tax liens, proceeds to discuss the prob-
lems posed by the "choate lien" and "no property" doctrines, relates
the purposes and functions of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 (the
Act), 3
 and analyzes the system of priorities under the Act, with refer-
ences to the more noteworthy of the proposed regulations published by
the Treasury Department. 4
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal tax lien is a secret lien arising at the time the tax is
assessed. IRC section 6321 5 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses
to pay the same after demand, the amount [with interest,
penalty and costs] shall be a lien in favor of the United
States on all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to such person. 6
* Partner, D'Ancona, Pflaum, Wyatt & Riskind, Chicago, Ill.; B.A., Hope College,
1965; J. D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hail), 1969. Appointed by President Ford
as White House Fellow-1975-76.
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323.
2 Uniform Commercial Code § 301 et seq. Although mentioned in passing, there is
included no detailed explanation of the priority afforded claims owing to the United States by
31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970), popularly termed "section 3466," under which certain types of
insolvency proceedings are invoked.
3 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719 § 101(a).
4
 Among the additional materials concerning federal tax liens are: W. Plumb, Jr.,
Federal Tax Liens (3d ed. 1972) (the most comprehensive treatment); Babitt & Freiman, The
Priority of Federal Claims: Selected Problems and Theoretical Considerations, 24 Case W,
Res. L. Rev. 521 (1973); Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon
Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369
(1968); Creedon, Assignm9nts for Security and Federal Tax Liens, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 535
(1969); Kennedy, From Spokane to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal Government
Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 724 (1965); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L.J.
905 (1954); Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L J. 185
(1967); Plumb, Federal Tax Liens and Priorities—Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 Yale L.J.
228 (1967); Young, Priority of the Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1967).
5 Int, Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
6 Id.
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The lien continues to encumber the present and after-acquired prop-
erty of the taxpayer until the tax liability is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable because of the lapse of time.?
An assessment that is based upon admitted liability set forth in
a tax return and that is .in excess of the amount paid is made by the
recording of the liability on a schedule maintained in the office of
the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service. 8 In the case of
an understatement of liability, the amount of understatement is
assessed and recorded when the tax return is processed and the
understatement discovered. In either case, the Government then
makes formal demand for payment upon the taxpayer either by
personal service or by mail. Although the tax lien attaches as of the
time of assessment, it cannot be enforced until demand is made
upon the taxpayer.
The tax lien is effective against the taxpayer and most unse-
cured creditors without filing. A public notice of tax lien, however,
must be filed to make the lien effective against prior purchasers,
holders of security interests, mechanic's lienors, or judgment lien
creditors. 9 IRC section 6323(f) provides for filing of a notice of a tax
lien: (1) in the case of real property, in the office designated by the
state in which the realty is located; and (2) in the case of personal
property, whether tangible or intangible, in the office designated by
the state in which the property is situated." Personal property is
deemed situated in the state of the taxpayer's residence rather than
in the state of his domicile. If a state fails to designate an office for
filing or if it designates more than one office for filing, the notice of
lien is to be filed in the office of the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the district in which the property is situated."
In order to make a tax lien effective against certain third party
interests, a notice must be filed. To keep the lien effective against
these third party interests beyond the initial six year period, 12 the
Government must refile its notice of lien within the one year period
ending six years and thirty days after the date of the assessment.
Further extensions are possible and require similar refiling during
each successive six year interval affected. The notice must be refiled
in the office of the original filing and, if the taxpayer has moved, in
the office designated by the state in which the taxpayer resides at the
time of the required refiling." However, if the Government reifies
7 See Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6203.
Id. § 6323(a).
111
 Id. § 6323(f).
" See United States v.. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286 (1970).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6502. See text at note 9 supra.
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(g).
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after the one year period ending six years and thirty days after the
date of assessment, the late refiling is considered a new filing which
may be subordinate to third party interests arising after the original
filing.' 4
IRC section 6322 15 provides that the tax lien continues until the
liability for the amount assessed, or a judgment against the taxpayer
arising from such liability, is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by
reason of lapse of time. 18 The statutory lapse of time is the period of
six years from the date of assessment of the tax or such extension of
time as may be agreed upon by the Government and the taxpayer. "
In addition to the taxpayer's agreement to prolong the period of
collection, the running of the statute of limitations may be sus-
pended during the period that assets of the taxpayer are in control or
custody of a court, and during the period in .which the taxpayer is
outside of the United States for six or more consecutive months. 18
The Government's filing of a lawsuit against the taxpayer may also
toll the statute of limitations. If the Government obtains a judg-
ment, the period for collection may remain open indefinitely."
II, TAX LIENS PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT OF 1966
A discussion of some of the important pre-1966 tax lien cases
and the choate lien doctrine is essential to an understanding of the
Act's system of priorities. For the past twenty years the federal tax
lien has held the upper hand in its battle with competing liens.
Under the tax lien law as it developed for insolvent taxpayer-
debtors, a lien competing with the federal tax lien was required to
be "choate" and perfected. The court-created concept of choateness
required that the lienholder establish the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the fixed amount of the lien.
' 4 For example, the Government makes a tax assessment against A on February 1, 1967.
On April 1, 1967, the Government files a notice of tax lien in the appropriate state office. On
June 1, 1972, A agrees to a three-year extension of the collection period to February 1, 1976.
On March 1, 1973, A grants a security interest in all of its equipment to B, who has no
knowledge of the agreement extending the collection period. On April I, 1973, the Govern-
ment refiles a tax lien notice against A in the appropriate state office. B's security interests will
take priority over the tax lien because the Government failed to refile within six years and
thirty days after the date of the tax assessment against A. Consequently, the Government's
refiling is treated as an original filing. If the Government had reified on March 1, 1973, the
tax lien would have priority over B's security interest.
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322.
16 Id,
17 Id. § 6502.
' Id. § 6503(b).
I ' See United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970). But see United States v.
Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 73-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cos, 11 9345, at 80747 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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A. Choate Lien Doctrine
The choate lien doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court
for the purpose of determining the priority rules for tax liens. Prior
to its 1950 decision in United States v. Security Trust & Savings
Bank, 2° the Court had developed a doctrine concerning the priority
granted to a federal tax lien in situations where the taxpayer-debtor
was insolvent. This doctrine relied upon the general federal priority
provisions contained in what is popularly termed, "section 3466":"
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is
insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor,
in the hands of the executors or administrators, is in-
sufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the
debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and
the priority established shall extend as well to cases in
which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all
his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in
which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed,
or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases
in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
Thus, in Spokane County v. United States, 23 a pre-1950 decision,
the Supreme Court held that federal priority under section 3466
prevailed over local tax liens which antedated the event (receiver-
ship) which triggered the application of section 3466. 24 This result
followed because the local liens were not, at the relevant point in
time, "specific," "perfected," or "complete" under state law. Some-
thing more had to be done before the local liens achieved a degree of
specificity or perfection which would entitle them to prevail over the
federal lien arising subsequently. 25
The first case in which this choate lien doctrine was applied to
a priority dispute under the Federal Tax Lien Act was United States
v. Security Trust & Savings Bank. 26
 That case, decided in 1950,
involved the priority between an attachment lien and a subsequently
arising federal tax lien. Because the attachment lien was subject
to certain contingencies which could prevent its enforceability, the
lien was considered inchoate and thus inferior to the federal tax
lien. 27 The Court in Security Trust relied on cases under the federal
20 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
21 31 U.S.C.	 191 (1970).
22 Id.
23
 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
24 Id. at 85-95.
25 Id. at 93-94.
26 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
27
 Id. at 51.
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priority provisions of section 3466. 28 Consequently, it remained
uncertain for some time whether the Federal Tax Lien Act standard
of choateness was as stringent as the standard applied under the
federal priority provision of section 3466. In United States v. Gilbert
Associates, Inc., 29 the circumstances permitted the United States to
claim a tax lien and a section 3466 priority. In holding that the
section 3466 lien had priority because the competing lienholder had
not gained title or possession of the disputed property, the Supreme
Court chose to rely solely on section 3466. 3° This suggested that, in
the Court's view, the tax lien statute had a weaker priority and that
the choateness test of the tax lien statute was less stringent than the
section 3466 test. 3 '
This suggestion appeared to be confirmed in United States v.
New Britain, 32 where the Court held that under Connecticut law, a
municipal tax lien assessed and filed prior to a later assessed federal
lien was sufficiently choate to prevail because it attached to specific
parcels of real estate. 33 The municipal lien was considered perfected
in the sense that there was "nothing more to be done to have a
choate lien [since] the identity of the lienor, the property subject to
the lien and the amount of the lien [was] established." 34 The Court
indicated, however, that the municipal lien would not have pre-
vailed over a subsequently arising section 3466 lien upon the prop-
erty of an insolvent. 35
As a result of the Supreme Court's 1956 decision in United
States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 36 however, the test of choateness
of a lien competing with a federal tax lien, appeared to be more
stringent than previously suggested. There the Court held
that a federal tax lien was prior to a statutory mechanic's lien, even
though the mechanic's lien was specific, prior in time, perfected in
the sense that everything possible under the state law had been done
to make it choate, and despite the fact that the mechanic's lien was
being enforced before the federal tax lien arose. 37
 In that case,
before the assessment of the federal tax, certain mechanics com-
pleted their work on a building, recorded their lien and sued to
enforce their lien in a local court. Although the only step lacking to
23 Id.
2° 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
3° Id. at 365.
31 Id. at 366.
32 347. U.S. 81 (1954).
33 Id. at 84.
34 Id .
35 Id. at 85.
36 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per curiam).
31 Id.
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settle the amount owing to the mechanics was a final judgment, the
Court held that the mechanic's lien was inchoate. 38 The Court did
not indicate whether it relied on section 3466 or IRC section 6323
for finding federal priority. -
After the White Bear Brewing decision, however, the Supreme
Court helped to clarify the law of federal tax liens by confirming its
previous intimation that the choateness test was not as severe for
liens arising under IRC section 6321 as it was for liens arising under
section 3466. 39 In its 1964 decision in United States v. Vermont,"
the Court found a competing state tax lien sufficiently choate, even
where the state lien covered all of the debtor's property.'" In that
case the ingenious Vermont legislature adopted the provisions of the
federal tax lien statute as its state statute for the collection of state
taxes. After Vermont had made a tax assessment against a solvent
taxpayer, the United States made an assessment. The Court held
that the antecedent state lien was sufficiently choate to obtain prior-
ity over the later federal tax lien. 42
Until 1958, the choate lien doctrine had never been applied to
defeat consensual security interests. Government counsel had ac-
quiesced in the priority of such interests and instead attacked statu-
tory, judicial and other non-consensual liens. However, in United
States v. R.F. Ball Construction Co.,43 the Supreme Court applied
the theory of the inchoate lien to a consensual security interest. In
that case, Ball, the principal contractor in a Texas housing project,
subcontracted some of the work to Jacobs, the taxpayer. 44 Ball
required Jacobs to obtain a performance bond from a surety com-
pany. Jacobs assigned to the surety all rights to sums becoming due
to Jacobs under the Texas housing project. The bond was executed
on July 23, 1951, but the surety never filed under the Texas ac-
counts receivable statute. 45 On April 4, 1952, Jacobs entered into a
similar arrangement with the same surety covering a second project
in Kentucky. On April 30, 1953, the sum of $13,228 became due to
Jacobs from the Texas project. Ball did not pay Jacobs because
Jacobs had not paid his material men. In late 1953, and early 1954,
Jacobs defaulted on the Kentucky project and the surety was re-
quired to pay $12,979. In March and May of 1953, federal taxes
were assessed against Jacobs and notices of liens were filed in May,
38
 See id. at 1011 (dissenting opinion).
39 United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
4° 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
' Id. at 358.
42
 Id. at 359.
43 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam).
" Id. at 588.
45 Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 260-1.
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June and September 1953. Ball filed an interpleader to determine
whom it should pay. 46 The Supreme Court held that the instrument
representing the surety's lien was inchoate and unperfected and thus
subordinate to the federal tax lien. 47
This decision placed in serious doubt the ability of a security
device to compete with a federal tax lien filed before the secured
property was acquired or before a future advance was actually
made. In a number of cases after the Ball decision, various security
interests were subordinated to federal tax liens." It appeared that
any security interest which was indefinite at any point as to the
precise amount of the debt secured, or the identity of the collateral,
was inchoate 'and subordinate. 49
Some comfort, however, was given to secured parties by the
Supreme Court's 1961 decision in United States v. Crest Finance
Co." In that case, Twin Excavating Company (Twin), a subcon-
tractor, had contracted with Standard-Crowley-Jackson (Standard),
the principal contractor, to supply labor and materials for the con-
struction of the Illinois Toll Road." From March through June,
1958, Crest Finance Company (Crest) loaned $67,722 to Twin,
secured by an assignment of the accounts receivable from Standard.
Standard was notified of the assignment and made some payments
to Crest. Under the Illinois accounts receivable statute, this assign-
ment was perfected when made and no filing was required. 52 In
August and November, 1958, federal tax liens were assessed against
Twin and a notice of tax lien was filed on October 9, 1958. At that
time, Standard's debt to Twin was not definitely determined. The
United States argued that the assignment of the accounts receivable
was inchoate because the exact amount of the accounts receivable
was unknown. 53 In affirming the district court, the Seventh Circuit
held that the case was controlled by the Ball decision and that the
assignment was inchoate. 54
After Crest petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, the
Solicitor General submitted a memorandum to the Court conceding
46 355 U.S. at 589.
47 Id. at 587.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1965); Bankhead v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 197 F. Supp. 879 (D. La. 1961); Arthur Co. v. Chicago Paints, Inc., 175
F. Supp. 50 (D. Minn. 1959); First State Bank v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 204 (D. Minn.
1958).
49
 See Comment, Federal Tax Liens and Assignees of Accounts Receivable: Priority
Without Reason, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 548 (1962); Note, Applicability of the "General and
Unperfected Lien" Doctrine to Contractual Liens, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 755 (1959).
5°
 368 U.S. 347 (1961).
5 ' United States v. Crest Fin. Co., 291 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1960).
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2,
	 220(c) (1959).
53 291 F.2d at 3.
84 Id.
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that if under Illinois law the assignment of the accounts receivable
need not be recorded, the assignment was a choate lien under the
principles set forth in United States v. New Britain. The Supreme
Court concurred with the Solicitor General's opinion and in a per
curiam opinion vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the
Seventh Circuit. 55 The Seventh Circuit then held that Crest's lien
was perfected under Illinois law without filing and was entitled to
priority over subsequent tax liens. 56
Following the Crest decision, the Supreme Court indicated in
United States v. Pioneer American Insurance Co." that consensual
liens must meet the same standards of choateness as non-consensual
liens. 58 In that case two Arkansas taxpayers assumed a note and a
deed of trust obligating them to pay a reasonable attorney's fee in
the event of default on the note. The taxpayer subsequently de-
faulted and the mortgagee brought suit to foreclose the deed of trust.
The local chancery court fixed the attorney's fee at $1,250 and
awarded the mortgagee's claim for attorney's fees priority over a tax
lien filed after the commencement of the foreclosure suit but before
the entry of the foreclosure decree." The Supreme Court held that
the federal tax lien was entitled to priority because the mortgagee's
claim for attorney's fees was inchoate when the tax lien was filed. 6°
The Court reasoned that at that time the amount of the attorney's
fee was uncertain and that there was no showing that the mortgagee
had become obligated to pay and had paid any attorney's fee at that
fi mei
This decision appeared to ignore the clear language of pre-1966
section 6323, which provided that a tax lien was not valid against
any mortgagee until the notice of lien was filed. 62 Under that sec-
tion, mortgagees were in a special class distinct from other lienhold-
55
 347 U.S. 81 (1954) (per curiam).
56 United States v. Crest Fin. Co., 302 F.2d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 1962). A similar result
was reached in Hammes v. Tucson Newspapers, Inc., 324 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1963), where a
debtor-taxpayer assigned certain installment payments to be received under a real property
sales contract. Although the assigned Installment in controversy did not become due until
after the federal tax lien was filed, the court held that the assignment was valid. Id. at 102.
The court deemed the lien chaste because it represented an "unconditional" present right to
receive money in the future. Id. at 103. See also United States v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co.,
373 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 380 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Sup.
Ct. 1964).
57 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
58 See id. at 88-91.
59 Id. at 86.
6° Id. at 89.
61
 Id. at 90.
62
 Prior to 1966, § 6323(cX1) read, in part: "[a] lien shall not be valid ... as against any
mortgagee . . . if at the time of such mortgage . . such mortgagee is without notice or
knowledge of the existence of such lien." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c)(1).
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ers. The requirement that a mortgagee's lien become choate before
notice of the federal tax lien was filed removed any uniqueness
previously accorded to mortgagees under section 6323 and placed
mortgagees in the same category as other lienholders. Thus, the
mortgage has to meet the New Britain requirements of choateness
before the federal tax lien notice was filed.
B. "No Property" Doctrine
Among the noteworthy pre-1966 tax lien cases are the "no
property" line of cases decided after the Ball decision. The "no
property" decisions held that because the federal tax lien attached to
all "property and rights of property belonging to" the taxpayer, the
lien did not attach to property belonging to someone other than the
taxpayer. 63 The federal tax lien could only attach to that interest of
a taxpayer which existed under applicable state law. The first case
in which the "no property" doctrine was applied to limit the effec-
tiveness of a tax lien was United States v. Bess." There, the
Supreme Court stated that the taxpayer's property interests in a life
insurance policy was to be determined by state law. 65 Applying state
law, the Court held that the federal tax lien attached only to the
proceeds which represented the cash surrender value." The tax-
payer's "property" was only a right to receive the cash surrender
value of the policy, not the full insurance proceeds payable upon his
death.
The Bess decision was relied upon in Aquilino v. United
States 67 and in United States v. Durham Lumber Co.," where the
Supreme Court applied the no-property doctrine and refused to give
a fund to the government because under state law, the taxpayer had
never acquired any property rights in the fund. 69 Both cases in-
volved money owing , to subcontractors and the Court concluded that
since under state law the taxpayer-general contractor did not have
any property interest in the money due him under the contract to the
extent that the subcontractors remained unpaid, the federal tax lien
could not attach to any money. 7°
Shortly after the Supreme Court rendered the Aquilino deci-
sion, the Third Circuit decided In re Halprin." In that case,
63 United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363
U.S. 522 (1960); Aquilino v, United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
64 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
65 Id. at 56.
66 Id.
63
 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
61 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
69 Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 513; Durham Lumber, 363 U.S. at 525-26.
5° Id.
71 280 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1960).
737
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Halprin had been engaged by Doniger, a garment manufacturer, to
sew and complete jackets. Under the contract, Halprin would re-
ceive a fixed sum upon delivery of the jackets to Doniger. The
United States filed a tax lien notice against Halprin after the con-
tract was made. Halprin then borrowed from a finance company in
order to meet his payroll and irrevocably assigned to the finance
company, as security for the loan, all sums to become due under his
contract with Doniger. Thereafter, Halprin delivered some com-
pleted jackets to Doniger. In Halprin's bankruptcy proceeding, the
United States and the finance company both claimed the money
owed by Doniger. The Third Circuit held that the federal tax lien
did not attach to a contingent or conditional right. 72 Accordingly,
Doniger's conditional promise to pay did not constitute "property
belonging to" Halprin so as to be subject to the tax lien. The Court
also emphasized that the loan from the finance company was used to
finance Halprin's contract with Doniger, so that the finance com-
pany was in a position similar to a purchase money mortgagee."
The Halprin case was clear authority for the application of the
no-property doctrine to assignments of collateral. Except for the
purchase money aspects, the decision was a difficult precedent for
the Government, because it allowed a taxpayer to assign future
monies effectively, even after a notice of tax lien had been filed. 74
III. PURPOSE OF THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT
The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 was the first comprehensive
revision of those internal revenue laws which concern the relationship
of federal tax liens to the interests of creditors other than the United
States. The main purpose of the Act was to conform the relevant
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to the concepts promulgated
in the UCC. Because the UCC evolved from business practices requir-
ing the protection of secured creditors, Congress thought it desirable to
conform federal tax liens with the recent developments in commercial
practice under the UCC. 75
72 Id. at 410.
73 Id.
74 There is some authority contrary to the Halprin decision. In United States v. L.R. Foy
Constr. Co., 300 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1962), The Tenth Circuit rejected the "no property"
doctrine but held for the assignee on the theory that its lien was choate. Id. at 211. In that
case, prior to the filing of the notice of tax lien, an assignment was made to secure the
taxpayer's indebtedness to a bank. Some of the indebtedness was acquired after the date of
filing of the federal tax lien. Id. at 209. The bank argued that the "no property" doctrine
protected the full indebtedness against the tax lien. The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the
assignment was similar to a mortgage and that the taxpayer's "property" was its equity of
redemption. Id. at 211. Consequently, the bank's assignment was entitled to priority only to
the extent that it was choate on the date of filing of the tax lien. See discussion in Creedon,
Assignments for Security and Federal Tax Liens, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 535, 549 (1969).
75 See S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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Prior to 1966, purchasers and certain secured creditors had
priority over federal tax liens until a notice of the tax lien was filed
in a designated office. The category of secured creditors entitled to
priority basically was limited to mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers
and judgment creditors, with extra protection allowed pledgees of
securities and purchasers of motor vehicles. The dominant effect of
the Act was to improve the position of secured creditors by: (1)
extending protection against unified tax liens to mechanic's lienors; 76
(2) providing a clear definition of certain classes of secured creditors
already protected regardless of choateness at the time notice of the
tax lien was filed; 77 (3) broadly increasing the classes of creditors
holding property interests for whom superpriority was to be given
even against a noticed tax lien; 78 (4) giving priority status to certain
interests created after filing of a tax lien if they arose under specified
types of financing agreements entered into before filing of the tax
lien; 79 and (5) providing a time period up to 45 days for further
protection of some interests after filing of notice of the tax lien. 80 In
addition, the Act codified much of the choateness doctrine, although
it did not use the familiar language "general and inchoate lien.""
IV. PROPERTY COVERED BY THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN
Section 6321 imposes a lien upon "all property and rights to
property, whether real or personal" belonging to the taxpayer. 82
Thus, the initial question is whether a taxpayer had "property" or
"rights to property" to which the lien could attach. This question
must be answered by the applicable state law which controls the
nature of the taxpayer's interest in property." The Act does not
create any property rights but merely attaches federally defined
consequences to rights existing under state law. 84 For example, if
76 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a).
77 Id .
" Id. §§ 6323(b)(1)-(9).
79 Id. § 6323(c).
10
 Id. § 6323(d).
al The House Report accompanying the bill which became the Act stated:
Under decisions of the Supreme Court a mortgagee, pledgee, or judgment
creditor is protected at the time notice of the tax lien is filed if the identity of the
lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are all established
at such time . . Except as otherwise provided, subsection (a) of new Section 6323
retains this basic rule of Federal law . . . . The holder of a security interest has
priority over a Federal tax lien if, at the time notice of the tax lien was filed, the
security interest ekists within the meaning of Section 6323 (h)(1) . . .
H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
62 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
" See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960).
34 See United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). But see Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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under the applicable state law, an irrevocable assignment of a life
insurance policy by a husband to a wife is bona fide and not in fraud
of creditors, that policy could not be reached by a tax lien on the
husband's property. 85
The federal tax lien is not limited to tangible property but is a
broad, comprehensive lien which attaches to all of the taxpayer's
property except certain exempt property. The exempt property in-
cludes wearing apparel, school books, fuels, provisions, furniture
and personal effects, books and tools of the trade or profession,
unemployment benefits, undelivered mail, certain annuity and pen-
sion payments, and workmen's compensation. 86 The federal tax lien
even attaches to property which is exempt from creditors' claims
under state law" and to property acquired by the taxpayer after the
time the tax lien arises. 88
 It also attaches to a taxpayer's right to
certain property which is conditional upon the taxpayer taking
certain action, 89 to a taxpayer's interest in property even though
that interest is terminable, 90. and to property which the taxpayer is
not unconditionally free to transfer."
It now appears that the federal tax lien attaches to a taxpayer's
accounts receivable previously collaterally assigned to a third party.
In 1972 in United States v. Trigg, 92 the no-property doctrine was
defeated with respect to such assigned accounts receivable. In that
case, a contractor assigned its accounts receivable to a bank. The
bank failed to perfect its security interest under the UCC by the
filing of a financing statement. 93 The Government served notice of
levy upon the contractor's account debtors and received payment for
work performed by the contractor. The bank brought an action
claiming priority over the tax lien. In awarding priority to the bank,
the district court had determined that the contractor's assignment of
accounts receivable divested the contractor of any property interest
in payments from its account debtors. 94 Therefore, the contractor
held no property interest in the progress payments upon which the
Government could attach by a tax lien. This result was based on the
See United States v. Burgo, 175 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1949).
"" See Bennsinger v. Davidson, 147 F. Sapp. 240 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
" See United States v, Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 429 (8th Cir. 1960) (notwithstanding state
homestead exemption, tax lien attached to taxpayer's home); Freed v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 241 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1959) (tax lien attached to disability insurance proceeds);
Campbell v. Campbell, 88 N.J. Super. 63, 67, 210 A.2d 644, 646 (1965) (tax lien attached to
alimony payments).
°° See Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945).
" 9 See United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir. 1964).
9° See Avco Delta Corp. v. United States, 459 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1972).
91 See Leuschner v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705, 708 (9th Cir. 1958).
92 465 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973).
93 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-302.
94 465 F.2d at 1267.
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Aquilino line of cases, 95
 which held that the federal tax lien statute
created no property rights but merely attached consequences to
rights created under state law. 96
In reversing the district court's decision, the Eighth Circuit
emphasized that the UCC does not classify a debtor's interest in the
collateral securing the debt-as "property" or "rights of property," the
terms used in the Aquilino line of cases. 97 The rights and duties of
the parties are stated in the UCC without reference to the location of
title to the collateral. Since the bank's security interest was unper-
fected, it was vulnerable to a lien creditor which, as indicated in
UCC 9-301, could reach property securing an unperfected interest in
accounts receivable. Thus, the court held that the federal tax lien
could attach to the accounts receivable. 98 The court then applied the
basic federal priority standard, "first in time is first in right," to hold
that the federal tax lien took priority over the bank's security-
interest, because the bank's security interest was not specific and
perfected before the tax lien arose. 99
A purchase money security interest normally is protected
whether or not it arises after a filing of a notice of tax lien. This
result is based on the theory that only the taxpayer's equity can be
reached by the tax lien. In a general explanation of the Act,,a House
of Representatives report states:
Although so-called purchase money mortgages are not
specifically referred to under present law, it has generally
been held that these interests are protected whenever they
arise. This is based on the concept that the taxpayer has
acquired property or a right to property only to the extent
that the value of the whole property or right exceeds the
amount of the purchase money mortgage. This concept is
not affected by the Hill.'"
V. PRIORITIES
Section 6323(a) protects third party interests of certain purchas-
ers, holders of security interests, mechanic's lienors and judgment
95 United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960); United States v. Bess, 357
U.S. 51 (1958).
95 E.g., Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960).
97 465 F.2d at 1269.
91 Id.
99
 Id. at 1270. The no property doctrine was similarly defeated in the recent case of
United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 494 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1974), where the
court held that a bank account pledged by a depositor was "property" of the taxpayer. Id. at
922.
'°° H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 817 (1966). Rev. Rul. 68-57, 1968-1 Cum.
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lien creditors if the interests arose before notice of the tax lien is
filed. 1 ° 1 Even if a filing is made, the tax lien will not prevail against
certain subsequently arising interests entitled to so-called superprior-
ity. : This superpriority status is given to certain persons without
actual notice or knowledge of the filing of the tax lien notice. This
category includes purchasers of securities, motor vehicles and prop-
erties sold at retail in the ordinary course of business. 102 Priority is
also given to certain security interests covered by commercial trans-
action financing agreements, real property or construction or im-
provement financing agreements, and obligatory disbursement
agreements. 103
Under the basic federal priority standard, "first in time is first
in right," if none of the special rules analyzed below apply, a federal
tax lien takes priority over a state-created lien unless the state lien is
specific and perfected before the federal tax lien arises. iO4 In order
to discuss the exceptions to this general rule, it is necessary to turn
to some of the definitions contained in the Act.
A. Definitions
1. Security Interests
IRC section 6323(h)(l) sets forth the following definition of a
security interest:
The term "security interest" means any interest in
property acquired by contract for the purpose of securing
payment or performance of an obligation or indemnifying
against loss or liability. A security interest exists at any
time (A) if, at such time, the property is in existence and
the interest has become protected under local law against a
subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obli-
gation and (B) to the extent that, at such time, the holder
has parted with money or money's worth.'° 5
This IRC definition includes security devices not covered by the
UCC, such as real estate mortgages and deeds of trust. It is
broader than the definition of security interest contained in UCC
section 1-201(37), in that it describes the amount of collateral cov-
Bull. 553, also supports this theory. It states that the Internal Revenue Service will consider a
purchase money security interest or mortgage valid under local law to be protected even
though it arose after a notice of federal tax lien was filed.
1 °' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a).
102 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(b).
103
 Id. § 6323(c).
1°4 See United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323, 327 (1966).
I" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(1).
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ered, measures the extent of the secured party's interest, and
requires that the interest be protected against a subsequent judg-
ment lien. The amount of collateral covered, however, is limited to
"property . . . in existence" at the time the notice of tax lien is
filed. °6
The security interest exists "to the extent that at the time the
[secured party] has parted with money or money's worth."" 7 Under
the treasury's proposed regulations, the term "money or money's
worth" includes money, securities, tangible or intangible property
and services.'" It does not include a relinquishing of dower, cur-
tesy, or other marital rights or any other consideration not reducible
to a money value.' 09
2. Mechanic's Lienor
According to the Internal Revenue Code, the term "mechanic's
lienor" is any person who, under local law, has a lien on real
property, or on the proceeds of a contract relating to real property,
for services, labor, or materials furnished in connection with the
construction or improvement of the real property.'" The mechanic's
lien arises either on the date on which the lien first became valid
under local law against subsequent purchasers without actual
notice, or on the date on which the mechanic begins to furnish
labor, services or materials, whichever date is the more recent.'"
3. Purchaser
A purchaser is *defined by the Act as one who, for adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, acquires an interest
(other than a lien), in property which is valid under local law
against subsequent purchasers without actual knowledge.' 12 An in-,
terest in property includes a lease of property, a written executory
contract to purchase or lease property, an option to purchase or
lease property and any interest therein, and an option to renew or
extend a lease of property. 13 The term "adequate and full consider-
ation in money or money's worth" means a consideration in money
or money's worth having a reasonable relationship to the true value
of the interest in the property acquired. This may include the
consideration in a bona fide bargain purchase or the consideration in
1 °6 This language is qualified by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c), which concerns
commercial financing agreements.
1°7
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(1).
101 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-1(a)(3), 38 Fed. Reg. 798 (1973).
109 Id .
iso int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(2).
111 Id.
112
 Id. § 6323(h)(3).
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an installment purchase contract, even though the purchaser has not
completed the installment payments.'" For example, A enters into
a contract for the purchase of a house and lot from •B. Under the
terms of the contract, A makes a down payment and is to pay the
balance of the purchase price in 120 monthly installments. After
payment of the last installment, A is to receive a deed to the
property. A enters into possession, which under local law protects
his interest in the property against subsequent purchasers without
actual notice. After A has paid five monthly installments, a notice of
tax lien is filed against B. Since the contract is an executory contract
to purchase property and is valid under local law against subsequent
purchasers without actual notice, A qualifies as a purchaser.
4. Actual Notice or Knowledge
Under the Act, an organization is deemed to have actual notice
or knowledge of a fact from the time the fact is brought to the
attention of the individual in the organization conducting the trans-
action or from the time the fact would have been brought to his
attention if the organization had exercised due diligence. 15 Due
diligence requires reasonable routines for communicating sig-
nificant information to the person conducting the transaction and
reasonable compliance with these routines. It does not require an
individual acting for the organization to communicate information
unless it is part of his regular duties or he has reason to know of the
transaction and the material facts of the transaction." 6
5. Subrogation
Where under local law one person is subrogated to the rights of
another in a lien or interest, he is subrogated to such rights for
purposes of a federal tax lien. Thus, if a tax lien is not valid with
respect to a bank's security interest, then the tax lien is not valid
with respect to the assignee of the bank's security interest)"
B. Priorities in Financing Agreements
1. Commercial Transactions Financing Agreements
a. General Requirements for Priority—Security interests are
protected, under commercial transaction financing agreements en-
tered into before a notice of federal tax lien was filed, provided: (1)
the disbursement of consideration for the security interests was
made and the security acquired not later than 45 days after the filing
'' See Proposed Treis. Reg. § 301.6323(h)(1)(f), 38 Fed. Reg. 794 (1973).
'Is Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 6323(1)(1).
"6 Id.
" 7
 Id. § 6323(i)(2).
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of notice of the tax lien; (2) at the time of such disbursements the
creditor had no actual notice or knowledge of the tax lien; and (3)
the security interest was perfected under local law as against a
judgment lien arising as of the time of filing of notice of the tax
lien. 118 Thus, the extent of the priority of the creditor's security
interest over the tax lien is the amount of his disbursement made
before the 46th day after the date of filing of the notice of tax lien or
made before the day on which the creditor has actual notice or
knowledge of the filing.
With respect to the property covered by the creditor's security
interest, however, the creditor's priority extends to property ac-
quired by the borrower after the creditor received actual knowledge
of the filing but before the 46th day after the filing. 119 Although the
receipt of actual knowledge of the filing of the tax lien notice
terminates the period within which protected disbursements may be
made to the borrower, the creditor's priority extends to commercial
financing security acquired by the borrower after the creditor's
receipt of such knowledge and before such 46th day. Thus, the
commercial financing exception permits a secured creditor to add or
substitute security not owned by the borrower at or before the filing
of the tax lien, but acquired by the borrower within 45 days after
the notice was filed.' 2°
A commercial transaction financing agreement is defined as an
agreement to make loans secured by commercial financing security,
or an agreement to purchase commercial financing security other
than inventory. 121 In either case, the security must be acquired by
the borrower in the ordinary course of its business. The lender need
not be a lending institution; it may be a customer financing its
supplier of goods or a distributor financing its customers on the
security of their receivables. 122
The term "commercial financing security" is defined as paper of
a kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions, accounts re-
ceivable, mortgages on real property, and inventory. 123 Paper of a
kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions include "contract
rights," "chattel paper," "instruments," and "documents" as defined
in the UCC. 124 Intangibles, such as copyrights and patents, are not
included. 125
118 Id. § 6323(c).
" 9
 Id. § 6323(c)(2)(B).
120 Id.
121 Id. § 6323(c)(2)(A).
122 See H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1966),
123 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c)(2)(C).
124 Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-201, 9-105.
1211 See H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35•(1966).
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If the conditions for this exception are met, the secured com-
mercial lender need search for tax liens only at the outset of the
transaction when the financing statement is filed, and at 45-day
intervals thereafter. Actual knowledge or notice of the tax lien will
shorten the 45-day grace period. The lender must terminate sub-
stitution of collateral within the 45-day period after the notice of tax
lien is filed, and must terminate disbursements to or for the bor-
rower upon actual notice or knowledge of the tax lien in order to
preserve his priority over the tax lien.' 26 As a practical precaution,
every lender should condition its obligation to make future advances
to the borrower upon the non-existence of a federal tax lien and
require the borrower to give notice of the existence of any such lien
as well as notice of the filing of a federal tax lien.
The same conditions apply to a factor purchasing commercial
financing security other than inventory, such as receivables. In that
case, the factor is protected to the same extent and under the same
rules as a commercial lender. According to the proposed regulations,
a bona fide purchase at a discount may be protected to the extent of
the full amount of the security purchased rather than only to the
extent of the purchaser's payment. 122
b. Choate Lien Doctrine' 28—One aspect of the commercial
transaction financing priority requires further discussion: the appli-
cation of the choate lien doctrine. The Act has not resolved the
choate lien problem. As stated in the House Report, except as
otherwise provided the specificity requirements of the choate lien
doctrine continue to apply under section 6323(a). 129 Thus, unless
otherwise provided in the Act, a lien must be specific as to: (1) the
identity of the lien; (2) the amount of the lien; and (3) the property
subject to the lien. The first decision under the Act was based on
pre-1966 cases and reached a debatable conclusion which reaffirmed
the choate lien test. In Continental Finance Inc. v. Cambridge Lee
Metal Co., ' 3 ° Continental obtained a perfected security interest in
an executory contract of Centre Trucking Company (Centre), prior
to a federal tax lien filing against Centre."' Certain accounts re-
ceivable arose under the contract but were not earned until the
45-day period after the filing of the notice of tax lien. Instead of
examining the new provisions of the Act to determine whether
contract rights were a proper subject for a security interest, the lower
"6 See Peninsula State Bank v. United States, 211 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1968).
127
 Proposed Treas. Reg, § 301.6323(c)-1(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 788 (1973).
121/ See text at note 12 supra.
129
 H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1966).
130
 100 N.J. Super. 324, 241 A.2d 853 (1968).
131 Id. at 325, 241 A.2d at 855.
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court analyzed prior law and held that Continental's security in-
terest in contract rights was' inchoate. 132 Accordingly, Continental's
security interest was subordinate to the federal tax lien. The New
Jersey appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. 133
In essence, the Continental decision held that contract rights, a
term now embodied within the definition of "accounts" in the re-
vised UCC, 134 cannot be the subject of an effective security interest.
Arguably, this holding ignores the inclusion of contract rights in the
definition of "commercial financing security" and the decision of the
Second Circuit in Rockmore v. Lehman. 135 In that case, the Second
Circuit held that an assignment of rights under an existing contract
did not constitute an assignment of after-acquired property.' 36 The
transfer was construed to be a single transfer of the rights under a
contract which had taken place more than four months before the
bankruptcy of the assignor. The transfer was deemed to take place
at the time the assignment was made without regard to the time the
payments were received under the contract.' 37
Nevertheless, in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States' 38 the
Fifth Circuit followed the rationale of the court in Continental
Finance. In Texas Oil, the Pecos Bank entered into a security
agreement with the taxpayer-debtor on March 25, 1967, and per-
fected its security interest in accounts receivable on March 29,
1967.' 39 Pursuant to that security agreement the bank agreed to
advance money at various times to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer
agreed to factor his accounts receivable with the bank as soon as
they arose. On February 27, 1970, the Government filed a tax lien
notice and attempted to levy on the proceeds of a contract between
the taxpayer and Texas Oil & Gas. That contract was entered into
in September 1970 and the taxpayer completed his services for
Texas Oil & Gas during the months of September, October and
November of 1970. The bank first became aware of the tax lien on
October 22, 1970, and shortly thereafter served notice on Texas Oil
& Gas that it also claimed all of the taxpayer's accounts receiv-
able.'"
The Fifth Circuit found that the accounts receivable were not
132 Id. at 335, 241 A.2d at 861.
133 Continental Fin. Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 105 N.J. Super. 406, 252 A.2d
417 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (per curiam).
134 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-103(3).
133 128 F.2d 564, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
134 128 F.2d at 564-66.
137 Id. at 567.
'3e
	 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1972).
139 Id. at 1044.
140 Id.
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"acquired" within 45 days of the filing of the tax lien because the
work was not performed for Texas Oil & Gas until after that
period."' Accordingly, because the final transaction creating the
accounts receivable had not occurred, the court held that the bank's
security interest was inchoate, and emphasized that both the trans-
actions of lending to the taxpayer and acquiring of the collateral by
the taxpayer must be completed within the 45-day period." 2
2. Real Property Construction and Improvement
Financing Agreements
IRC section 6323(c)(3) gives a special priority to property in-
terests under real estate construction or improvement financing
agreements.'" These property interests have priority over a filed tax
lien even though the cash disbursements are made after filing.
However, in this case, the priority is provided without regard to
whether the disbursements occur within 45 days of the filing of the
notice of tax lien. The disbursements are also protected although
made with knowledge of the tax lien. Although no time limit applies
to cash disbursements under this type of agreement, a 45-day time
limit applies to additional security put up by the borrower. Such
security only has priority with respect to advances made before or
within 45 days after the filing of the tax lien notice and before the
lender has actual notice or knowledge of the tax lien.'" If the
borrower is required to place his share of the construction costs in
escrow, that share may be viewed as additional security for the
construction loan. In such a case, a lender should consider requiring
that the amount escrowed by the borrower be the first money
expended on the construction process.'"
The types of financing agreements covered are basically agree-
ments covering cash disbursements paid: (1) to an owner of real
property for construction or improvement of the property; (2) to a
builder operating under a contract to construct or improve real
property; and (3) to a borrower for raising or harvesting farm crops
or raising livestock. 146
 This special priority is limited to interests
arising from cash disbursements, except in the case of financing
livestock and farm crops where the disbursements may arise in the
form of goods and services."' The protection afforded by this
"I Id. at 1051.
142 Id.
143 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(03)-
144 Id. § 6323(b).
345 See W. Plumb, Jr., Federal Tax Liens 98 (3d ed. 1972).
346 Int.. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(cX3).
"7 See H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1966) ; Winstead v. Johnson Feed
Serv., Inc., 73-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. 9329, at 80708 (III. Cir. Ct. 1972) (landlord's security
interest in crops held protected as securing payment for services).
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special priority is further limited to real property security, in the
case of advances made to the owner, and to the proceeds of the
contract, in the case of advances to the contractor.'"
The rationale for this special priority is that the disbursements
generally enhance the value of the property. Completion of the
construction or the improvement of real property or the completion
of the raising of crops or livestock normally increases the value of
the property by more than the amount of the disbursement. 149 In
addition, terminating this type of loan upon the discovery of a tax
lien may be impractical. A lender who has made substantial ad-
vances to a construction project often can recover his investment
only if the project is completed. As with all types of financing
agreements accorded special priority under IRC section 6323(c), the
agreement must be in writing and must be executed before the filing
of the tax lien. In addition, the security interest created by the
agreement must have priority under local law against a judgment lien
creditor as of the time of the filing of the tax lien. t50
3. Security Interests Under Obligatory Disbursement
Agreements
The general exception permitting a 45-day grace period follow-
ing the perfection of a security interest would not provide much
comfort to a lender who has obligated himself to make future
advances upon the happening of an event outside of his control.
Accordingly, the interest of a lender created by advancements under
a written, obligatory disbursement agreement is given priority if the
agreement is entered into before the tax lien is filed and in the
ordinary course of the lender's business."'
An "obligatory disbursement agreement" is defined as
148 See Plumb, supra note 145, at 97.
149 See H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1966).
15° The following example illustrates the priority provisions of § 6323(c):
A, hi order to finance the construction of a dwelling on a lot owned by him,
mortgages the property to B. The mortgage, executed January 4, 1971, includes an
agreement that B will make cash disbursements to A as the construction progresses.
On February 1, 1971, a notice of tax lien is filed against A. A continues the
construction and B makes cash disbursements on June 10, 1971 and December 10,
1971. Under local law, B's security interest, arising by virtue of the disbursements, is
protected against a judgment lien arising February 1, 1971 (the date of tax lien
filing). Because B is the holder of a security interest coming into existence by reason
of cash disbursements made pursuant to a written agreement, entered into before tax
lien filing, to make cash disbursements to finance the construction of real property,
and because B's security interest is protected under local law against a judgment lien
arising as of the time of tax lien filing, B's security interest has priority over the tax
lien.
Proposed Trees. Reg. § 301.6323(c) and (d), 38 Fed. Reg. 788, 789 (1973).
I " See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(cX4).
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[a]n agreement [entered into by a person in the course of
his trade or business] to make disbursements, but such an
agreement shall be treated as coming within the term only
to the extent of disbursements which are required to be
made by reason of the intervention of the rights of a person
other than the taxpayer.' 52
As with all special priorities accorded to financing agreements under
IRC section 6323(c), the written obligatory disbursement agreement
must be entered into, and the security interest created thereunder
must be perfected, prior to the filing of the notice of the tax lien. In
addition, the obligatory disbursement agreement must be made in
the course of trade or business of the disburser. Thus, accommoda-
tion endorsers are not protected unless the accommodation is inci-
dental to the operation of a trade or business.' 53
To acquire special priority, the disbursements must be made as
a result of the exercise of the rights of a party other than the
taxpayer and upon the happening of an event beyond the lender's
control. Thus, if the taxpayer-borrower can require the lender to
make future disbursements, this special priority does not apply. The
lender is then relegated to the general priority rule which provides
protection only for disbursements made within 45 days of the filing
of the tax lien and without notice or knowledge of the tax lien. In
this case, a lender should negotiate an escape clause relieving him
from his obligation to make future disbursements if a notice of tax
lien is filed. Tax lien searches must then be made at no less than
45-day intervals. A lender should also consider the possibility of
using letters of credit so that rights of third parties are injected into
his commitments. 154
No time limit is placed upon the disbursements which may be
made under the shelter of this priority where the third party has the
right to demand the disbursement. Knowledge of the tax lien will
not vitiate the priority. The priority applies to the extent of property
on hand at the time of the tax lien filing and, if the financing
agreement so provides, the priority extends to other property where
the acquisition of such • property is directly traceable to the dis-
bursements.'" For example, assume that pursuant to a written
132
 Id. 6323(cX4)(A). An example of such an agreement is an irrevocable letter of credit
where a bank issuing the letter must honor a demand for payment by a third party who
advances credit in reliance upon the bank's letter of credit. Another example would be a
surety's agreement to finance the completion of a contract entered into by the taxpayer. See
H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
133 See Proposed Treas. Reg.
	 301.6323(c)-3(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 788 (1973).
154
 See Plumb, supra note 145, at 94.
155
 Id.
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agreement, ABC Bank issues an irrevocable letter of credit to T for
the purpose of financing T's purchase of refrigerators. After the
filing of the notice of tax lien against T, the ABC Bank honors a
demand for payment on its letter of credit. Assuming that the
general requirements applicable to all types of financing agreements
under IRC section 6323(c) have been fulfilled, ABC Bank will have
priority over the tax lien with respect to the refrigerators purchased
by T and to property directly traceable to its cash disbursements,
such as the proceeds from the sale of the refrigerators.
If an effort is made to foreclose on a tax lien before all of the
potential obligations under an obligatory disbursement are met, an
amount sufficient to cover the potential obligations is usually set
aside. Only after the obligations have been met is any remainder
available for the satisfaction of the tax lien. 156
The Federal Tax Lien Act also sets forth special rules for
surety agreements:
Where the obligatory disbursement agreement is an agree-
ment insuring the performance of a contract between the
taxpayer and another person, the security interest entitled
to special priority may be in the proceeds of the insured
contract. If the insured contract is a contract to construct
or improve real property, to produce goods or to furnish
services, the security interest may be in any tangible per-
sonal property used in the performance of the contract. 157
For example, on July 1, 1974, C is awarded a contract to construct
an office building. B executes a written agreement to ensure the
performance of the contract. The agreement provides that in the
event B must complete the job as a result of a default by C, B will
be entitled to the proceeds of the contract. In addition, the agree-
ment provides that B will have a security interest in all of C's
property. On December 1, 1974, prior to the completion of the
building, C defaults. On the same day, a notice of tax lien is filed
against C. B completes the building on July 1, 1975. Under local
law, B's security interest in the proceeds of the contract and in C's
property are entitled to priority over a judgment lien arising De-
cember 1, 1974 (date of tax lien filing). B's security interest in the
proceeds of the contract has priority over the tax lien, even though.
the notice of tax lien was filed before B's security interest arose. B's
security interest in any of C's tangible personal property used in
performance of the contract also has priority over the tax lien.
I" See H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
' 57
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(cX4).
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C. Priority Rule for 45-Day Period for Disbursements with
Respect to Security Interests Generally
In addition to the priorities for financing agreements, the Act
also provides priority generally with respect to those security in-
terests in property, held by the taxpayer before the tax lien filing,
which arise as a result of disbursements made within 45 days after
the filing of a tax lien notice. 158 This grace period, however, will
end when the lender obtains actual notice or knowledge of the filing
of the tax lien. For the priority to exist, a written security agreement
must be entered into before the date of tax lien filing and the
security interests created thereunder must be protected against a
judgment lien arising as of the time of tax filing.' 59
As in the case of commercial transactions financing agreements,
this priority is designed to make it unnecessary for the secured
lender to search the tax lien records more often than once every 45
days where one or more disbursements are to be made by him. 16°
D. Priority for Interest and Expenses
The Act also provides a priority for the interest with respect to
and for certain costs of, preserving property to which is attached a
lien or security interest entitled to priority over a federal tax lien. 16 I
This priority exists only to the extent local law provides for the
same priority for interest and expenses as the lien or security interest
to which it relates.' 62
E. Superpriorities
Certain third party interests in property are accorded a higher
status than a federal tax lien, even if the interests arise after the
filing of the tax lien notice. Prior to the Act the federal tax lien law
I" Id. § 6323(d).
156 Id,
I" See H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1966).
767 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c).
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 The types of items referred to here are:
(1) interest or carrying charges (including finance and services charges) on the
obligation secured by a lien or security interest;
(2) reasonable expenses of an indenture trustee (such as a trustee under a deed
of trust) or agent holding a security interest;
(3) reasonable expenses incurred in collecting and enforcing a secured obligation
(including reasonable attorney's fees);
(4) reasonable costs of insuring, preserving or repairing the property subject to
the lien or security interest;
(5) reasonable costs of insuring payment of the obligation (such as mortgage
insurance); and
(6) amounts paid by the holder of a lien or security interest to satisfy another
lien on the property where. this other lien has priority over the Federal tax lien.
H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1966). See Int, Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c).
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accorded this special protection to mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers
of securities, and certain purchasers of motor vehicles, provided
they did not have knowledge' of the filed tax lien.' 63 The Act
retained this special protection and added additional categories of
interests entitled to this "superpriority" protection.' 64
1. Security Interest in Securities
Superpriority is accorded to: (1) a purchaser of a security who,
at the time of purchase, did•not have actual notice or knowledge of
the tax lien; and (2) a holder of a security interest in a security who
had no actual knowledge or notice of a tax lien at the time the
security interest came into being.' 65 Since the test is whether the
holder of a security interest had notice or knowledge of the tax lien,
the transfer of a security interest in a security from a person with
knowledge of the tax lien to a transferee without such knowledge
will protect the transferee from the tax lien. On the other hand, the
transfer from a holder of such a security interest with knowledge of
the tax lien to a transferee with knowledge bars superpriority for the
holder of that security interest.
In addition, if a person without knowledge of the tax lien
acquires a security interest in a security interest in securities (for
example, a security interest in notes secured by a security), he may
not be considered a holder of a security interest in the security and
may not be accorded superpriority. Therefore, lending institutions
may be advised to consider purchasing notes secured by securities
rather than securing loans with such notes. 166
"3 See text at notes 75, 76 supra.
16" IM. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(b).
165
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(4) defines the term "security" as:
[Alny bond, debenture, note or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued
by a corporation or a government or political subdivision thereof, with interest,
coupons or in registered form, share of stock, voting trust certificate, or any cer-
tificate of interest or participating in, certificate of deposit or receipt for, temporary
or interim certificate for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; negotiable instrument; or money.
166
 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(b)-1(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 782 (1973), contain the
following example of this superpriority:
On July 1, 1970, a notice of tax lien is filed against E. E owns 100 $1,000 bonds
issued by the Y Company. On July 5, 1970, E borrows $4,000 from F and delivers
the bonds to F as collateral for the loan. At the time the loan is made, F has actual
knowledge of the existence of the tax lien and, therefore, holds the security interest
in the bonds. ,G does not have actual notice or knowledge of the existence of the lien
on July 10, 1970. Because C became the holder of a security interest in a security
interest after notice of lien was filed and does not directly have a security interest in
a security, the security interest held by G is not entitled to a priority over the tax
lien.
See Plumb, supra note 145, at 78-79.
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2. Security Interest in Motor Vehicles
Even though a notice of tax lien is filed, the lien is not valid as
against the purchaser of a motor vehicle if: (1) at the time of the
purchase, the purchaser did not have actual notice or knowledge of
the lien; and (2) he obtains possession of the vehicle before he had
notice and knowledge of the tax lien and does not thereafter relin-
quish possession to the seller or his agent. 167
Although a purchaser of a motor vehicle is accorded superprior-
ity to the extent he purchases without knowledge or notice of the
lien, no special priority is given to security interests in motor vehi-
cles. Consequently, a lender contemplating securing of a loan with a
motor vehicle should search for federal tax liens. State laws requir-
ing the notation of lien on the title certificate do not bind the
Government.' 68
3. Loans Secured by Insurance Policies
An insurance company is protected in making a loan on a
policy, even though a notice of tax lien has been filed. 169 However,
this priority is provided only where the company has .no actual
notice or knowledge of the lien. Thus, an insurance company need
not search for tax liens before making a policy loan. The rationale
for this priority is that the company is making a prepayment of its
obligation under the insurance policy rather than providing a loan to
a policyholder.'" Moreover, the insurance company will have prior-
ity with respect to automatic premium loans required by a pre-
existing agreement to maintain the policy in force even where it has
notice or knowledge of the tax lien filing."'
If a tax levy on an insurance contract is satisfied by the insur-
ance company, the company will have priority for any subsequent
loans until the Government delivers to the company a new notifica-
tion of tax lien on the policy. This requirement avoids the necessity
of the insurance company checking on the payment of tax liability in
each case where levy has been previously made on the policy.'"
167 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
	 6323(6)(2).
'" See Merchants Loan Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 227, 228 (D. Ariz. 1957).
169
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,	 6323(b)(9).
1 " See United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 112 (3d Cir. 1964).
- ' 7 ' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 6323(bX9XB). An example of the workings of this super-
priority provision is as follows: On June 2, 1973, a notice of tax lien is filed against D. On
July 2, 1973, D executes an assignment of his rights, as the insured, under an insurance
contract to M Bank as security for a Loan. M Bank's security interest is subject to the tax lien
because the bank is not an insurer entitled to protection under IRC section 6323(bX9) and did
not become a secured party prior to the filing of the notice of tax lien,
177 Id.
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4. Passbook Loans
Banks, savings and loan associations, and similar institutions
often make loans to their savings account depositors. Those loans
often are secured by the borrower's account with the institution,
evidenced by a passbook. Superpriority status is granted to such an
institution if it has no actual notice or knowledge of a tax lien and if
the institution retains possession of the passbook until the loan is
paid off. 173
 The loan must be secured by an account at the institu-
tion making the loan, and the institution must be either a bank or
savings institution of the type described in IRC section 581 or
591. 174 Superpriority status will not attach to any loans made after
the date knowledge of the tax lien is acquired.' 75
5. Purchase of Personal Property at Retail and Casual Sales
Purchasers of tangible personal property sold at retail in the
ordinary course of the seller's trade or business are given superprior-
ity status unless the purchaser intends to interfere with the collection
of the federal tax or knows that the purchase would so interfere. 176
Household goods, personal effects or certain other personal property
purchased in a casual sale for less than $250 are also protected if the
purchaser has no knowledge of the existence of the tax lien.'"
6. Possessory Liens
Where local law provides a repairman or similar person holding
continuous possession of personal property, with a lien securing
payment of the repairman's charge, the repairman is protected
against the tax lien even if he has knowledge of the tax lien before
he undertakes the work.'" The rationale for this superpriority is
that the repairman's work enhances the value of the property and,
173
 Id. § 6323(b)(I0).
' 74 Id.
175 Proposed Treas, Reg. § 301.6323(b)-1(F), 38 Fed. Reg. 782 (1973) provides the
following example of passbook loan priority:
On June 2, 1970, a notice of lien is filed against A. A owns a savings account at the
M Bank with a balance of $1,000. On June 10, 1970, A borrows $300 from the M
Bank, using the savings account as security. The M Bank is continuously in
possession of the passbook from the time the loan is made and does not have actual
notice or knowledge of the lien at the time of the loan. The tax lien is not valid
against M Bank with respect to the passbook loan of $300 and accrued interest and
expenses, Upon service of a notice of levy, the M Bank must pay over the savings
account balance in excess of the amount of its protected interest in the account as
determined on the date of levy.
176
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(bX3).
177
 Id. § 6323(bX4).
176
 Id. § 6323(b)(5).
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as a result, the value of the tax lien. The superpriority is limited to
the reasonable price of the repairs or improvements.
7. Real Property, Taxes and Special Assessments
Where state and local government liens covering real property
taxes and special assessments have priority under local law as
against holders of security interests, such liens are granted super-
priority status.'"
8. Repairs and Improvements to Real Property
Superpriority status is also given to persons who under local
law are granted a non-possessory mechanic's lien for repairs and
improvements to real property. The lien must arise as the result of
work on a personal residence containing not more than four dwell-
ing units. Additional requirements are that the property must be
occupied by the owner and the contract charges must not exceed
$1 ,000. 180
9. Attorney's Lien
Where pursuant to local law an attorney is afforded a lien
against any fund his efforts create for his client, or where the
attorney holds a contract enforceable against such a fund, the attor-
ney is accorded superpriority to the extent of his reasonable compen-
sation."' "Reasonable" compensation has been construed as the
amount normally allowed under local law for attorney's services in
litigating or settling a similar claim.'"
F. Circuity of Priority
Because the Act imposes a second priority system upon a state
priority system, the "first-in-time, first-in-right" rule occasionally
causes circular priority problems. For example, B and C have liens
against A's equipment. Thereafter, the Government files a notice of
tax lien against A's property. Under state law, B's lien is superior to
C's lien. If C's lien is choate but B's lien is not, the tax lien would be
entitled to priority over B's lien, but not to priority over C's lien.
In United States v. New Britain,'" the Supreme Court re-
solved this circular priority problem in a two-step process. First, the
federal law of priorities was applied. An amount equal to the
interest taking priority over the tax lien was set aside to be distri-
379 Id. § 6323(b)(6).
1 " Id. § 6323(b)(7).
tin Id. § 6323(b)(8).
I" See Jackson Mfg. Co. v. United States, 69-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. 4 9383, at 84590
(N.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 434 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970).
1.3
 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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buted according to state law priority.'" In the example above, if C's
lien is choate and prior to the tax lien, the amount of C's lien would
be set aside. However, since B's lien has priority under state law,
B's lien would be first satisfied and any surplus would be applied to
the satisfaction of the tax lien. Any surplus remaining after the
satisfaction of the tax lien would be distributed to satisfy C's lien.
G. Subordination of the Tax Lien
IRC section 6323(b)(3) permits the Internal Revenue Service to
subordinate an otherwise superior federal tax lien to another lien or
interest. 185 There are two conditions under which the Service is
authorized to issue a certificate of subordination: (1) there is paid to
the Service an amout equal to the amount of the lien or interest to
which the tax lien is subordinated; or (2) the Service believes that
such subordination will improve the chance of ultimate collection of
the tax by the Government.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion is an attempt to arrange the priority
system of IRC section 6323 in a clear format. Applying the Act is a
formidable task. The choate lien problem is not resolved, and the
"no property" doctrine remains amorphous. Only conjecture will
reveal any thread of consistency. Since the legislative history of the
Act clearly discloses an intent to conform the priority systems of the
Act to the priority system of the UCC, reference to that body of
state law will continue to throw light upon the workings of the Act.
If promulgated, the proposed treasury regulations will also aid in
the clarification of this complex priority system.
1S4 Id. at 88.
185 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(b)(3).
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